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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper explains public policy endogenous growth models and estimates effects of 
fiscal adjustment on growth in twenty-six transition economies. It uses annual data on 
fiscal variables and growth during 1992-2001. Expansionary fiscal contractions is 
observed in transition economies, which can be explained by factors specific to 
transition economies. These non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy during adjustment 
are termed as creative destruction in transition economies as these economies inherit 
inefficiencies and underutilized capacity. Most of the transition economies underwent 
fiscal consolidation in early 1990s, it included post-communist countries. This paper 
analyses the effect of fiscal consolidation on growth using a fixed-effect model. The 
paper also provides graphical analysis of expenditure compositions, which is helpful 
in explaining the econometric estimations. 
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 4 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Unlike market economies, transition economies inherit inefficiencies and under-
utilized capacity decreasing the role of new investment. The reform of transition 
economies result in painful creative destruction. Transition economies can have non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy during adjustment. 
 
Advancements in endogenous growth theory have demonstrated that fiscal policy can 
have long-run effects on economic growth. Barro (1990) provided a theoretical 
foundation for public policy endogenous growth models. Considering public services 
as an input to private production creates a potentially positive linkage between public 
services and growth. Various versions of the endogenous growth model have been 
estimated using OECD and developing countries’ datasets.  
 
This paper explains the effect of fiscal policy on growth in the economies in 
transition. The systematic estimation of the public policy endogenous growth model 
has been limited to OECD and developing countries due to the data availability 
problems in the transition economies. Fiscal adjustment policies were adopted in most 
of the transition economies during early 1990s. On one hand this provides grounds for 
panel data estimation of the effects of fiscal adjustment. On the other hand this 
considerably reduces the sample size because newly independent transition economies 
lack data reporting procedures to be used for panel data estimation during this time 
span. 
 
Therefore, panel data estimations are supplemented with descriptive analysis of the 
data on transition economies directly acquired from the Recent Economic 
Development (REDs) reports of the IMF. Annual data 1992-2001 covers twenty-six 
transition economies. 
 
The shortcoming in the estimations, owing to small sample size, can also be supported 
by comparing the methodologies and findings of public policy endogenous growth 
models in OECD and developing countries.  
 
Section II provides brief background of endogenous growth theory incorporating 
public policy. Section III compares the estimated model, methodologies, and findings 
in OECD and developing countries. Section IV explains the application of general 
growth theories during transition, and presents the estimation in transition economies. 
Section V concludes the essay. 
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II. Public Policy Endogenous Growth Model 
 
 
In neo-classical growth models, tax and expenditure measures that influence saving 
rate or the incentive to invest in physical or human capital have no effect on the 
steady state growth rate. Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) illustrate such findings of the 
neo-classical model. Fiscal policy is limited to determining the transition path to 
steady state in these models.  
 
The general features of these neo-classical growth models include, constant or 
increasing returns in the factors that can be accumulated. In the absence of 
externalities it is possible that the privately determined choices of saving and growth 
are Pareto optimal.  
 
In the endogenous growth model, decentralized choices lead to a suboptimal rate of 
saving and economic growth (Arrow 1962; Romer 1986). Private returns on 
investment diverge from the social return. The spillover effects of knowledge or other 
externalities lead to diminishing private returns while social return can be constant or 
increasing.  
 
Barro (1990) initially considers the role of public services as an input to private 
production. It is this productive role that creates a potentially positive linkage between 
government and growth. The private production function exhibits constant returns to 
scale in government (public services) and capital together, but diminishing returns in 
capital separately. Therefore, government provision of services is considered as being 
complementary to private inputs.  
 
Assumptions in Endogenous Growth Model in Barro (1990): 
 
• Constant returns to a broad concept of capital. 
• Infinite lived household. 
• Closed economy. 
• Constant rate of time preference. 
• Constant population. 
• Marginal utility has constant elasticity. 
• No labour-leisure choice. 
• Economy is always on steady-state growth rate. 
• Sufficiently productive technology to ensure positive steady-state growth. 
• Bounded utility. 
 
Under these assumptions, the representative, infinite-lived household in a closed 
economy seeks to maximize overall utility, as given by 
 
U u c e dt
t
=
∞
∫
−
( ) ,
0
ρ
      (1) 
 
 
where c  is consumption per person and ρ  > 0 is the constant rate of time preference. 
The utility function is: 
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u c c( ) ,= −
−
−1 1
1
σ
σ
      (2) 
 
where σ > 0, so that marginal utility has the constant elasticity -σ . 
Each household-producer has access to the production function 
 
   y f k= ( ),        (3) 
 
where y  is output per worker and k  is capital per worker. Each person works a given 
amount of time; that is, there is no labour-leisure choice. As is well known, the 
maximization of the representative household’s overall utility in equation (1) implies 
that the growth rate of consumption at each point in time is given by 
 
c
c
f
•
= ⋅ −
1
σ
ρ( ' )       (4) 
 
where f '  is the marginal product of capital. Instead of assuming diminishing returns 
( f ' '< 0 ), constant returns to a broad concept of capital is assumed; that is, 
 
   y Ak= ,        (5) 
 
where A > 0 is the constant net marginal product of capital.  
 
The assumption of constant returns becomes more plausible when capital is viewed 
broadly to encompass human and nonhuman capital. Human and nonhuman capital 
need not be perfect substitutes in production. Therefore, production may show 
roughly constant returns to scale in the two types of capital taken together but 
diminishing returns in either input separately.  
 
Substituting f '  = A into equation (4) yields 
 
γ
σ
ρ= = ⋅ −
•
c
c
A1 ( ),       (6) 
 
where symbol γ denotes a per capita growth rate. Technology is sufficiently 
productive to ensure positive steady-state growth, but not so productive as to yield 
unbounded utility.  
 
In this model the economy is always at a position of steady-state growth in which all 
variables: c k, ,and y , grow at the rate γ shown in equation (6).  
 
The Model is modified to incorporate a public sector. Let g be the quantity of public 
services provided to each household-producer. It is assumed that these services are 
provided without user charges and are not subject congestion effects (which might 
arise for highways or some other public services). That is, the model abstracts from 
externalities associated with the use of public services.  
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Considering public services as an input to private production, it is this productive role 
that creates a potentially positive linkage between government (public services) and 
growth. Production now exhibits constant returns to scale in k  and g together but 
diminishing returns in k  separately. That is, even with a broad concept of private 
capital, production involves decreasing returns to private inputs if the 
(complementary) government inputs do not expand in a parallel manner. 
 
Given constant returns to scale, the production function can be written as 
 
y k g k g
k
= =Φ( , ) . ( )φ       (7) 
        
where Φ satisfies the usual conditions for positive and diminishing marginal products, 
so that φ'> 0 and φ' '<0. The variable k  is the representative producer’s quantity of 
capital, which would correspond to the per capita amount of aggregate capital. Barro 
(1990) assumes that g can be measured correspondingly by the per capita quantity of 
government purchases of goods and services. The general idea of including g as a 
separate argument of the production function is that private inputs, represented by k , 
are not a close substitute for public inputs.  
 
The production in equation (1) implies that the marginal product of capital is 
 
∂
∂
φ φ φ η
y
k
g
k
g
y
g
k
= ⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ ⋅ −
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ =
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ −1 1' ( )      (8) 
 
where η  is the elasticity of y  with respect to g (for a given value of k  ),  
so that 0 < η  < 1.  
 
The representative consumer assumes that changes in his quantity of capital and 
output do not lead to any changes in his amount of public services. Therefore, 
marginal product in equation (1), ∂ ∂y k/ , is calculated by varying k , while holding 
g fixed. 
 
The general idea of including g as a separate argument of the production function is 
that private inputs, represented by k , are not a close substitutes for public inputs. 
Private activity would not readily replace public activity if user charges were difficult 
to implement, as in the case of such nonexcludable services as national defense and 
the maintenance of law and order. In other cases, user charges would be undesirable, 
either because the service is nonrival or because external effects cause private 
production to be too low (as is sometimes argued for basic education) Barro (1990).  
 
Assuming that government expenditure is financed contemporaneously by a flat-rate 
tax 
 
g T y k g
k
= = = ⋅ ⋅ ⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟τ τ φ ,      (9) 
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where T  is government revenue and τ  is the tax rate. Consider normalizing the 
number of households to unity so that g corresponds to aggregate expenditure and T  
to aggregate revenues. Then equation (9) constrains the government to run a balanced 
budget. That is, the government can neither finance deficits by issuing debt nor run 
surpluses by accumulating assets. 
 
Private optimization still leads to a path of consumption that satisfies equation (4), 
except that f '  is replaced by the private marginal return to capital. With the presence 
of a flat-rate income tax at rate τ , this return is ( ) ( / ),1− ⋅τ ∂ ∂y k  where ( / )∂ ∂y k is 
given from equation (8). Therefore the growth rate of consumption is now 
γ
σ
τ φ η ρ= = ⋅ − ⋅ ⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ ⋅ − −
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
•
c
c
g
k
1 1 1( ) ( ) ,    (10) 
 
As long as τ  and, hence, g y/ are constants – that is, the government sets g and T to 
grow at the same rate as y  – g k/ and η and therefore the growth rate γ will be 
constants. The economy has no transition dynamics and is always in a position of 
steady-state growth in which all quantities grow at the rate γ shown in equation (10). 
 
Different sizes of governments – that is, different values for g y/ and τ  –  have two 
effects on the growth rate, γ , in equation (10). An increase in τ  reduces γ , but an 
increase in g y/  raises ∂ ∂y k/ , which raises γ . Typically, the second force 
dominates when the government is small, and the first force dominates when the 
government is large. A simple example is the Cobb-Douglas technology, in whichη –  
the elasticity of y  with respect to g – is constant. The conditions τ = g y/  and 
g k g y g k/ ( / ). ( / )= φ  imply that the derivative of γ with respect to g y/  is (when 
η is constant in the case of Cobb-Douglas technology) 
 
d
d g y
g
k
γ
σ
φ φ
( / )
( ' ),= ⋅ ⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ ⋅ −
1 1       (11) 
 
Hence the growth rate increases with g y/  if g k/ is small enough so that φ'>1and 
declines with g y/ if g k/ is large enough so that φ'<1. With a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, the size of government that maximizes the growth rate corresponds to the 
natural condition for productive efficiency:φ'=1. Roughly speaking, to maximize the 
growth rate, the government sets its share of gross national product, g y/ , to equal 
the share it would get if public services were a competitively supplied input of 
production. 
 
 
 9 
III.  Empirical Models of Fiscal Policy and Growth 
 
 
Kneller et al, (1999) finds support for Barro model (1990), while analysing the affect 
of the share of government expenditure in output, or composition of expenditure and 
revenue, on the long-run growth rate. Earlier studies had not been designed to test the 
predictions of endogenous growth models with respect to the structure of both 
taxation and expenditure. The studies that only take account of one side of the budget 
and ignore the other suffer from systematic biases to the parameters estimates 
associated with the implicit financing assumptions.  
 
Kneller et al (1999) classifies government budgets into one of the four categories: 
distortionary or non-distortionary taxation and productive or non-productive 
expenditures. Distortionary taxation is considered to affect investment decisions of 
the agents (with respect to physical and/or human capital), distorting steady state rate 
of growth by creating tax wedges. Non-distortionary taxation has no effect on the rate 
of growth as it does not affect saving/investment decisions because of the assumed 
nature of the preference function. The components of government expenditure 
included as arguments in the private production function are considered as productive 
expenditure otherwise they are classified as non-productive expenditures and do not 
affect the steady-state rate of growth. 
 
There are debates on the classification of particular expenditures as productive or non-
productive, or of particular taxes as distortionary or non-distortionary. Different 
degrees of expenditure and revenue can also define the classifcation of expenditure as 
productive or non-productive, or of particular taxes as distortionary or non-
distortionary.  
 
Kneller et al. (1999) used panel data of 22 OECD countries covering 1970-95 to 
estimate the effect of fiscal variable on growth. Theoretical classification of 
expenditure and revenue are taken from the IMF functional classifications.  
 
Kneller et al. (1999) takes 5-year averages to remove the effects of the business cycle, 
and then applies simple static panel data econometric techniques. Five different forms 
of panel data estimators for each regression are considered initially; pooled OLS, one-
way (country dummies) fixed and random effects models; fixed (by OLS) and random 
(by GLS and two-way (country and time effects)). Conditioning variables are those 
found in the usual Barro-type regression: Initial GDP, Investment, Labour Force 
Growth. Since the hypothesis of no correlation amongst the individual effects and the 
error term is rejected, results from the fixed effects models are preferred. 
 
Non-distortionary taxation and non-productive expenditures are omitted to avoid 
perfect collinearity. Productive expenditure have a significant positive coefficient, and 
the point estimate suggests that an increase by one percentage point of GDP raises the 
growth rate by 0.27 percentage points. Distortionary taxation, on the other hand, 
significantly reduces growth: its estimated coefficients in –0.41.  
 
Kneller etal. (1999) concludes that the government budget constraint implies that the 
estimated coefficient of each fiscal element within a growth regression will depend on 
how it is financed. The estimated model support the prediction of Barro (1990) that 
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shifting the revenue stance away from distortionary forms of taxation and towards 
non-distortionary forms has a growth-enhancing effect, whereas switching 
expenditure from productive, and towards unproductive, forms is growth retarding. 
Non-distortionary tax-financed increases in productive expenditures are predicted to 
have a positive impact upon the growth rate, whereas with distortionary-tax financing 
the predicted growth effect is ambiguous. Finally non-productive expenditures 
financed by a distortionary tax have an unambiguously negative growth effect, but a 
zero effect is predicted if non-distortionary tax finance is used (Barro, 1990). 
 
Adam et al. (2003) examined the relation between fiscal deficits and growth for a 
panel of 45 developing countries during 1970-99. The main finding of the paper is the 
threshold effect at a level of the deficit. Adam et al. (2003) highlights the 
nonlinearities in the relationship between growth and fiscal deficit, which can mask 
important and policy relevant implications especially in low- and middle- income 
countries. The threshold effect of fiscal deficit on growth is found at 1.5% of GDP. 
Corresponding threshold effects are found in the component of deficit financing. Non-
linearity is observed in the effect of seigniorage financing on growth but there is no 
evidence, in the sample of developing countries used in Adam et al. (2003), of a 
similar non-linearity arising from debt-financing. 
 
Adam et al. (2003) partition total non-interest expenditure into two groups, 
‘productive expenditure’ defined as expenditure on health, education, infrastructure, 
public order and safety (including defence and public administration, all of which 
have been identified to have some growth enhancing element. The ‘residual 
expenditure’ category consisting of economic services, recreation and culture, plus 
other miscellaneous expenditure. Residual expenditure is not assumed as the direct 
counterpart of the ‘unproductive expenditure’. The IMF functional classification is 
used for the composition of productive and residual expenditure.  
 
Adam et al (2003) take 5-year averages to smooth over some cyclical features of the 
data. The low degree of variability in fiscal aggregates relative to growth (both across 
countries and over time) hampers finding statistically strong effects from regression 
analysis. The empirical model is also specified taking fiscal factors impact on growth 
with a lag. Adam et al (2003) uses bootstrap method to identify threshold effect in 
Fiscal Deficit, Seigniorage and Debt-financing. Data indicates a threshold for the 
conventional deficit level of 1.5 percent of GDP and Seiniorage threshold at around 
1.25 percent of GDP but there is no support for a debt-financing threshold. In 
addition, Deficit threshold is underpinned by a threshold effect in Seigniorage 
financing.  
 
Fixed effect estimation is used to estimate the model. The coefficient of each 
individual fiscal factor is net of the (unknown) impact of an increase in residual 
expenditure. Baseline model, that is the model without any threshold, confirms that 
the average effect of a deficit-financed increase in ‘residual’ expenditure is negative. 
Including deficit threshold improves the overall fit of the model and the threshold 
itself is statistically significant. The values of the deficit less than or equal to the 
threshold is growth enhancing and affect is reversed at the deficit greater than 
threshold of 1.5% of GDP. The change in the sign is not marginal, it is sufficient to 
have overall negative effect of the deficit (0.264-0.473 = -0.209). This indicates the 
existence of a growth-maximizing deficit. There is a possibility that the effect is not 
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substantial as the interpretation of the coefficient on the fiscal deficit either side of the 
threshold remains strictly net of the excluded fiscal category.  
 
The results are robust when total debt, its components (external and domestic debt) 
and reserve money are interacted with overall budget deficit and used as regressors in 
the model.  High debt stock exacerbate the adverse consequences of high deficits. 
Although, Adam et al. (2003) focuses on the effect of fiscal deficit and its financing 
components on the growth rate in developing countries. The underlying theoretical 
model and statistical estimation is similar to analysing the effect of other fiscal 
variables on growth in endogenous growth models.  
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) uses the same sample of developing countries as Adam et al 
(2003) to show the conditions under which a change in composition of expenditure 
lead to a higher steady-state growth rate of the economy. It is possible to show 
empirically that in addition to physical productivity of the different components of 
public expenditure, the initial shares of the expenditure component also determine the 
effect on the growth rate.   
 
The estimation of the model with total current expenditure as share of total 
expenditure provides evidence against the policy advice received by developing 
countries. A unit increase in this ratio increases the per-capita real GDP growth rate 
by 0.05 percentage points. The evidence on effect of capital spending as share of total 
expenditure also belies the standard hypothesis. Thus seemingly productive, capital 
expenditure, when used in excess could become unproductive. These results imply 
that developing-country governments have been misallocating public expenditures in 
favour of capital expenditures at the expense of current expenditures.  
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) uses sub-divisions of components of expenditure in the 
regression. For instance, public spending on health care is disaggregated into 
expenditure on (i) hospital affairs and services, (ii) clinics providing mainly out-
patient services (iii) public health affairs and services (mainly preventive care). 
Although, total public health expenditure as a share of total expenditure is not 
positively related to the per-capita growth rate, its share of health expenditure on 
preventive care and research and development has some growth effects.  
 
Similarly the education variable is disaggregated into (i) administration, management, 
inspection, operation of pre-primary, primary and secondary education, (ii) tertiary 
education (iii) other education. The last component of spending on education includes 
subsidiary services to education (transportation, food, lodging, medical, and other 
such services to students), program units engaged in administrating, supporting, or 
carrying out applied research into teaching methods and objectives, into learning 
theory and curriculum development, etc. A unit increase in the share of this category 
of education spending leads to an increase of 0.63 percentage points in per-capita real 
GDP. 
 
Devarajan et al (1996) rerun the regressions with a sample of 21 developed countries, 
the conclusions are reversed and the results conform to standard hypothesis. 
Nonlinear specification is also estimated based on the intuition that as the shares keep 
rising, decreasing returns to scale set in and, eventually, the relationship between the 
two variables turns negative; such as the share of current expenditure (net of interest 
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spending) in the budget and the decreasing function of the square term. In the case of 
capital expenditure the square term is statistically significant; the coefficient on the 
other variable is not. In the case of capital expenditure the data points cluster around 
the downward sloping negative part of the functional relationship while in the case of 
current expenditure data pints cluster around the positive and upward sloping part of 
the functional relationship. 
 
Devarajan et al (1996) also compared the data on central government and general 
government. As defence is primarily responsibility of the central government the ratio 
of defence to total expenditure decreases for general government; the share of 
education expenditure is larger for general government indicating that state and local 
government allocate a higher budgetary share for education. The data on expenditure 
ratios also indicate that state and local governments spend more money on capital but 
less on current expenditure.  
 
The main finding of Devarajan et al (1996) is that developing-country governments 
have been misallocating public expenditures in favour of capital expenditures at the 
expense of current expenditures, and studies on developed countries extrapolate that 
they have been doing reverse.  
 
Gupta et al (2002) provides empirical evidence of the relationship between fiscal 
adjustment, expenditure composition and economic growth in a sample of 39 low-
income countries during 1990-2000. Annual data on IMF Economic Classification of 
public expenditure is used to estimate the model. Terms of Trade, Initial primary 
enrolment and Initial secondary enrolment are used as conditioning variables in 
addition to the usual Barro conditioning variables.  The economic composition divides 
the data into Wages and Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Interest Payments, Other 
Goods and Services and Capital Expenditure.  
 
The model presents estimations using LSDV and GMM (IVREG and Arelano-Bond). 
Results indicate that fiscal adjustment leads towards higher growth; cutting 
unproductive expenditure and protecting capital outlays at the time of adjustment also 
have positive impact on growth. Public sector wage bill has negative effect on growth 
and is considered as unproductive expenditure. The composition of financing also has 
a significant impact in low-income countries; reducing domestic financing increases 
growth as the funds became available for private investment. Initial level of GDP also 
determines growth, as explained by convergence theory.  
 
Fiscal policy can have nonlinear effects on growth given the degree of 
macroeconomic stability. The sample is split in pre- and post- stabilization countries. 
A post-stabilization country is defined as a country that maintained an average fiscal 
deficit (after grants) of less than 2.5 percent of GDP during the period 1990-2000. 
Only seven countries are classified as post-stabilization according to this definition, 
majority of the countries in the sample have not yet achieved macroeconomic 
stability. In post-stabilization economies, increases in public investment and public 
consumption tend to exhibit more typical Keynesian effect. In these countries, fiscal 
policies leading to an increase in the share of spending on transfers and non-wage 
goods and services are likely to be supportive of growth (Gupta et. al. 2002). 
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IV. Fiscal Policy and Growth in Transition Economies 
 
 
Transition economies pass through painful reallocation and restructuring as explained 
by Schumpeterain ‘creative destruction’. It requires two changes, forcing a move from 
a sellers’ market to a buyers’ market and enforcing a hard budget constraint. The 
process comprises of two elements, reallocation of resources from old to new 
activities, and restructuring within surviving firms. The consensus in general growth 
theories that investment is a major engine of growth in the medium to long term is not 
applicable in transition economies. Inefficiencies and under-utilized capacity, 
inherited in transition economies, decreases the role of new investment. In addition 
there are other political economy factors determining growth in transition economies 
as described below. 
 
Broad base democracy was conducive for growth for the transition economies. 
Fidrmuc (2002) provides wide range of analysis on relationship between economic 
liberalization, democratization, economic growth and initial conditions. The impact of 
democracy on economic growth is substantial. However, it also includes indirect 
effect of economic liberalization as democracy facilitates the economic liberalization 
process. The protracted recession in transition economies was not a consequence of 
democratization. There is a positive relationship between economic development and 
democratization. 
 
Macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms are the key factors to achieve 
sustainable growth, early stabilization and strong structural reforms have positive 
effect on growth during transition. The initial conditions hurt growth but the effect is 
small. Havrylyshyn (1998) analyzed the determinants of growth in 25 transition 
economies using 1990-97 data. The additional variables introduced in the analysis are 
the two clusters of initial conditions, the first capturing macroeconomic distortions 
and unfamiliarity with market processes and the second the level of socialist 
development and its associated distortions. Initial conditions such as 1989 levels of 
per capita income, the degree of industrialisation in 1990 and deviation from the 
average degree of industrialisation in 1990 are used for simple interpretation of initial 
conditions.  
 
The econometric analysis is simplified using simple regression with two variables in 
comparison with complex regressions. More than one lag is used to account for the 
varying effect of variables, such as economic reform, on growth. The empirical results 
confirm Schumpter’s Creative Destruction. Sample is also divided in two sub-periods 
(1990-93) and (1994-97) to separate the negative growth period from the recovery 
period. The explanatory power of the economic reform variables is higher in the 
recovery period. Using sub-indices shows the destructive effect of price liberalization 
in the early years, but do not have additional significance in comparison with 
aggregate general index of economic reform. This also confirms that the combination 
of policies is more important than any single type of policy. Little effort is needed to 
compensate for the unfavourable initial conditions, creating a trade off between 
unfavourable conditions and more reforms. Factor investment, proxied as investment 
ratio, has a negative effect on growth and confirms Wolf (1997) findings. 
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Among transition economies CIS countries have been much slower in implementing 
structural reforms, took longer (nearly two years) to establish the low rates of 
inflation, initial conditions were less favourable therefore the rebound was weaker. 
CIS could overcome the problem by introducing more structural reforms, such 
reforms are also comparable with Soviet Union. 
 
The phenomenon of expansionary fiscal contractions and contractionary fiscal 
expansions is very common in transition economies. Perrotti (1999) provides 
theoretical explanation of such change in response in the case of OECD countries. 
 
 
a. Model 
 
Perotti (1999) lays out a simple model where a government expenditure shock have a 
positive, “Keynesian” correlation with private consumption in normal times, and a 
negative, “non-Keynesian” correlation in bad times. Depending on the initial 
conditions the correlation between private consumption and shocks to government 
expenditure and revenue, changes. In a neoclassical model a cut in government 
expenditure would always have expansionary effects on private consumption. 
However, such a model would not in itself display a switch in the effects of fiscal 
policy, and neither would a purely Keynesian model. Bad times are associated with 
high debt or deficit. 
 
Perroti (1999) explains this change in response using assumptions (i) Distortionary 
taxation (ii) Policy-maker who effectively discounts the future more than the private 
sector (iii) Co-existance of credit-constrained individual and individuals with free 
access to credit market and (iv) Government expenditure with positive effect on 
output because of the presence of nominal or real rigidities.  
 
Consumers live for three periods (0,1,2). Change in consumption between period 1 
and 0 as a function of the fiscal policy shock is then summarized by the behaviour of 
fiscal policy in period 2, the last period of the model. Individuals have quadratic 
utility, and their only decision concerns the choice between consumption and savings. 
Population is divided in two types of individuals; 1−µ  have unrestricted access to 
credit markets at the market interest rate, while the remaining fractionµ  are credit 
constrained. From standard consumption arguments and assuming the both rate of 
time preference and the interest are 0, the change in consumption of unconstrained 
individuals between 1 and 0 is simply half the innovation in the PDV of their 
disposable income; 
 
ΔC Y Y Y Yu1 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 11 2= − − + − +[( ) / ][( ) ( )] ,/ / /µ ε  
 
where u  refers to unconstrained individuals, Yi  represents disposable income in i, and 
Ki j/  denotes the expectation of in period i, formed in period j. The disturbance ε1  
represents, for instance, transitional consumption and in general shocks to preferences 
in period 1. 
 
For credit constrained individuals the change in consumption between 1 and 0 is 
identically equal to the change in disposable income: 
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Δ ΔC Yc1 1= µ ,  
 
where c refers to constrained individuals. 
 
Y Y Z G T Tt t t t t t
Y= + + − − +
_
,α β λ ς2   β λ> >0 0; , 
 
where Zt  is a row vector of variables and a column vector of associated coefficients, 
Tt  is total taxes on individuals, Gt is government expenditure, and ςt
Y is a stochastic 
disturbance. Taxes have two types of effect on disposable income. An increase in 
taxation causes a one-to-one fall in the after-tax disposable income. Only the PDV of 
taxation not its timing would matter to unconstrained individuals if taxation were 
distortionary. The second effect is the distortions it causes on pre-tax income; in this 
model with inelastic labour supply and no investment, this effect is captured in a very 
simple way by the quadratic terms −λTt
2 . 
 
If the initial expected path is upward sloping (i.e., T T1 0 2 0/ /<  ), a consolidation in 
period 1 that increases current taxes at a given PDV of taxation causes T1  to get closer 
to T2 1/  . As a consequence, the PDV of tax distortions falls, and the wealth of 
unconstrained individuals increases. Hence, an upward-sloping expected path for 
taxation is a necessary condition for a rise in taxes to be associated with an increase in 
consumption this is the basic intuition of Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997). 
Perroti (1999) explains two natural and very compelling reasons for an upward 
sloping expected path of taxation (i.e. absence of tax-smoothing) different from 
Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997). 
 
First, even if taxes were set by a benevolent dictator with the same horizon as the 
whole economy, a tax-smoothing policy would not maximize the expected lifetime 
utility of constrained individuals: if pre-tax disposable income is increasing over time, 
their expected lifetime utility would be maximized if taxes also were growing over 
time, so as to smooth disposable income and therefore consumption. Second, an 
upward loping expected path of taxation is the natural outcome of virtually any 
realistic positive description of tax policy in this model. In particular, this would be 
the outcome if the tax rate were set in each period by a policymaker with a shorter 
effective horizon than the private sector, for instance because a policy-maker with 
different preferences will be in charge next period with positive probability. The 
current policy-maker sets allow level of taxation and thus bequeaths the next policy-
maker a large deficit. This forces the next policy-maker to use the tax revenues 
increase to repay the deficit Perroti (1999). 
 
The first baseline model in our study uses economic classification of expenditure 
composition as a percentage of GDP along with Tax Revenue, Non Tax Revenue and 
Grants all as percentage of GDP as used in Gupta et al (2002). We call it Model A, it 
is formulated as follows; 
 
, /
1 1
i t i i t h iht it
qk
i h
g Y XGDP uα β β
= =
 = + + +∑ ∑  
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where ,i tg  , is the growth rate of real per capita GDP; /i tY  is vector of non-fiscal 
independent variables given below; 
 
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥=
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
i/t
i/t
/ i/t
i/t
i/t
Initial Level of GDP per capita growth
Private Investment Ratio
Terms of Trade
Labour Force
Initial Level of Secondary Enrollment
i tY  
 
and ihtXGDP  is a vector of independent fiscal  variables aimed at capturing the effect 
of the consumption of the budget, it is described below;  
 
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢= ⎢
⎣
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
Wages & Salaries % GDP
Goods & Services % GDP
Transfers & Subsidies % GDP
Interest Payments % GDP
Capital Expenditure % GDP
Tax Revenue % GDP
NonTax Revenue % GDP
Grants % GDP
ihtXGDP
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎦
 
 
The second baseline model (Model B) uses economic classification of expenditure 
composition as a percentage of Total Expenditure and financing components are 
replaced by Budget Balance as a percentage of GDP. The model is formulated as 
follows; 
 
, /
1 1
i t i i t h iht it
qk
i h
g Y XBALEXP uα β β
= =
 = + + +∑ ∑  
 
/i tY  is same as in the first specification and ihtXBALEXP  is given below; 
 
 &  %  
 &   %  
 &   %  
  %  
  %  
it
it
it
iht
it
W ages Salaries Total Expenditure
Goods Services Total Expenditure
Transfers Subsidies Total Expenditure
XBALEXP
Interest Payments Total Expenditure
Capital Expenditure Total Exp
=
  % 
it
it
enditure
Budget Balance GDP
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
 
b. Data 
 
This paper uses data on 25 transition economies from 1992-2001. Data on 
Composition of expenditure, deficit financing and fiscal stance measured as balance 
on cash basis are used as determinants of real per capita GDP growth. Expenditure 
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composition is defined using economic classification in the data available in Recent 
Economic Development (RED) country reports of the IMF. Discontinuity in the 
transition economies data is exacerbated as some countries, such as Russia, recently 
adopted economic classification format for data reporting.  
 
Growth Model is conditioned on percentage change in Investment, Terms of Trade, 
Labour Force and Secondary Education. These variables are extracted from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Corruption index is taken from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  Observations with substantially higher Cook’s D 
statistics for the residuals are eliminated. 
 
The data used in the regression analysis is the sub-sample of the data used in 
descriptive analysis, as the one missing observation eliminates the entire row in panel 
data estimation. Graphical analysis does not show significant variation between sub-
sample  and the complete sample, except for the Grants data used in Model A. The 
distribution of the variables in the sub-sample is also similar. 
 
Total Investment is used as condition variable due to unavailability of private 
investment data in transition economies. It can possibly cause multicolinearity with 
Capital Expenditure composition of the budget, the correlation between Capital 
Expenditure and Total Investment is (+0.32) . Total Investment can also cause the 
problem of endogeneity, if it is determined by the GDP Growth Rate. Instrumenting 
Total Investment with one year lagged value in GMM can solve the problem, however 
it does not lead to any change in the estimated Models. This can be explained in 
transition economies, as the Total Investment is more dependent on Public 
expenditure than on the growth in the economy.  
 
 
c. Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 1: GDP Growth Rate and Balance (1992-2001) 
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There is an overall trend between decrease in balance deficit and an increase in GDP 
growth in Fig 1., which shows fiscal adjustments have not been harmful for growth. 
The trend is more obvious in the CIS countries. Looking at the trend in revenue and 
expenditure and the composition of expenditure shows major factors contributing to 
the declining trend in deficit. 
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Figure 2: Total Expenditure and Total Revenue (1992-2001) 
Total Expenditure and Total Revenue
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
ToT ExpG
TotRevG
 
 
In the overall sample of 26 countries, while total expenditure declined the total 
revenue did not decrease in the sample period which narrowed the difference in most 
of the years (Fig. 2). This also shows that the decline in the total expenditure was not 
driven by the lack of ability to collect revenue, given tax revenue was the only 
varying component of the total revenue (Fig. 3). The analysis is consistent when 
extended to the regions CEE and the CIS. Again the missing values in the Baltics does 
not allow to analyse such variations. However, Mongolia has shown an increase in the 
non-tax revenue component. 
 
 
Figure 3: Tax and Non-Tax Revenue (1992-2001) 
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Fig 4. shows a decrease in Government Total Expenditure by 4% in the overall 
sample of 26 countries during 1993-97. A decrease in Transfers spending by 6% and 
3% in Wages & Salaries during 1992-97 contributed in the decline of Total 
Expenditure. Goods & Services, Capital Spending and Interest payments were largely 
stable during this period. 
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Figure 4: Expenditure Composition (1992-2001) 
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Same analysis was extended to divided regions as Baltics, CEE, CIS and Mongolia, 
regional classifications are given in Appendix Table 6.. Missing values of Goods & 
Services in the Baltics during initial adjustment period (1992 and 93) hampers such 
analysis for the Baltics. CEE countries show relatively less decline, around 5% in the 
total expenditure as compared to sharp decline of 20% in CIS countries during 1992-
97 as shown in Fig 5 and Fig 6. However, adjustment in both regions is coming from 
decrease in Transfers Spending. The substantial decrease in Transfers spending in CIS 
countries is also reflected in the complete sample of 26 countries in Fig 4. Transfers 
payment in the CIS countries increased in 1993 by 7% before decline started. 
However, this increase was an internal adjustment of the budget as the spending on 
Wages & Salaries and Good & Services was decreased, partially offsetting the effect 
on the total spending. 
 
 
Figure 5: Expenditure Composition of CIS (1992-2001) 
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This initial internal adjustment in the government budget in the CIS countries can be 
expected in an adjustment phase if the decrease in the government size is achieved 
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through a decrease in government sector employment which increases transfers to 
unemployed. However, this increase in transfers was reversed in the next year 
(i.e.1994). This can also be explained using Schumpeterian concept of creative 
destruction, as the unemployment increases during reallocation of resources from old 
to new activities and secondly, restructuring within surviving firms. This increase in 
unemployment during initial adjustment period is reflected by increase in transfers 
followed by a decrease in transfers in Fig 5. 
 
 
Figure 6: Expenditure Composition of CEE (1992-2001) 
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CEE countries does not seem to explain a similar decline and recovery period. The 
decrease in transfers is gradual and the only factor to bring down total government 
spending. The composition of Wages & Salaries was also unaffected, which partly 
explains the smooth decline in transfers as the government sector did not make 
redundancies to shrink the government size. The decrease in transfers could be one of 
the effects of decline in subsidies which is expected during transition. This also draws 
to the conclusion that the CEE countries did not have an unnecessarily large 
government sector employment and therefore adjustment phase was less critical.  
 
In Fig 4. the declining trend of total expenditure eroded by an increase which started 
during 1998-99 in the complete sample of countries. This rise can be attributed to the 
Russian Currency Crisis, however, looking at the composition of total expenditure in 
the CEE and CIS countries explains different reactions. Transfers increased in the 
CEE countries indicating towards slowdown of the economy in response to the 
Russian Currency Crisis. In the case of CIS countries nearly all the compositions of 
the budget increased unlike CEE countries response to the Russian Currency Crisis. 
The individual country budget composition shows Transfer and Interests as the two 
major channels contributing towards increase in total expenditure during 1998-1999. 
 
Financial and economic analysis identified a number of transmission channels of the 
Russain financial crisis into central Asia which is part of CIS countries. These 
channels included: (1) direct and indirect impact of central Asian exports and imports; 
(2) a possible loss of market shares to central Asian exporters to Russain enterprises 
that benefited from the sharp devaluation of the ruble; (3) reduced external capital 
flows to central Asia; and (4) the crisis’s potential for accelerating structural reforms 
in central Asia. Pastor (2001). 
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Russian financial crisis also affected the exports within CIS countries other than 
Russia, such as central Asian commodity exports to the other CIS countries also 
declined. These countries also experienced sharp increase in the Debt-to-GDP ratio. 
These transmission channels explain the increase in the transfers and interest 
payments leading to increase in the total expenditure during 1998-99. 
 
 
Figure 7: Expenditure Composition of Mongolia (1992-2001) 
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The changes in the total expenditure in Mongolia are driven mainly by the changes in 
the capital spending. An increase in capital spending in 1993 is followed by a 
decrease in capital spending which is reflected in total spending in Fig 7, other 
components of the budget remained unchanged. Changes in total expenditure driven 
by changes in capital expenditure can not be attributed to fiscal adjustment as the 
capital outlays can be discontinued without substantially affecting the government 
role in the society. Secondly, after an optimal level of infrastructure has been built 
capital outlays should be discontinued to avoid inefficient allocation of resources in 
infrastructure. 
 
The trend is shown in Fig. 8 which shows financing components as percentage of total 
financing, it is more salient in the CIS countries as shown in Fig. 9. The sharp 
increase in foreign finance in 1999 is mainly due to the Russian Currency Crisis. 
Incomplete datasets for Mongolia limits the analysis to be extended to this region.  
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Figure 8: Financing Components (1992-2001) 
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Figure 9: Financing Components of CIS (1992-2001) 
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d. Econometric Analysis 
 
The variables taking account of structural and institutional development, such as 
economic reform and democracy, as suggested by Purfield (2003) and  Fidrmuc 
(2002) does not explain the model well. Although regional differences are observed in 
graphical analysis such as differences in adjustment composition in the CIS, the 
regional dummy variable based on four regions CIS, CEE, Baltics and Mongolia does 
not improve the model. Similarly, the interaction of High Debt Dummy with Deficit 
and High Inflation Dummy with Deficit are trivial. Period dummy, separating the 
negative growth period (1992-94) from recovery period (1995-2001), has significant 
effect on model as compared to annual dummy.  
 
LSDV (Fixed-effects) estimation is used to take account of country specific effects 
which could lead to serious biases otherwise. The Within Groups or Fixed effects in 
the model we use are able to control for unobserved country heterogeneities and the 
problems caused by the omitted variables. The Within Groups or Fixed Effects 
estimator seeks to address the source of the inconsistency by applying OLS to 
transformed equations. These express the original observations for each cross 
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sectional observation ( i ) as deviations from the time means for each cross sectional 
observation i .  
 
Budget Balance 
The overall trend observed in graphical analysis (in Fig. 1) that fiscal adjustment have 
not been harmful for growth is confirmed with the highly significant and positive 
estimated coefficient of balance in all versions of Model B in columns [1] and [2] in 
Table 2. One percentage point increase in Budget Balance (i.e. surplus) leads to 0.6 
percentage point increase in the growth rate. This provides evidence for expansionary 
fiscal contractions in transition economies, called non-Keynesian effect of fiscal 
policy during bad times in Perroti (1999). 
 
Period Dummy 
Period dummy is significantly negative in models A and B in second columns of 
Table 1 and 2. Negative impact on growth in the initial three years is captured by the 
period dummy separating (1992-1994) negative growth period from (1995-2001) 
recovery period. 
 
Transfers Payments 
In Model A, columns [1] and [2] in Table 1, Transfers as percentage of GDP are 
highly significant and substantially negative, around -1.1 . Looking at this negative 
coefficient of Transfers in Model A and the decrease in transfers as the major fiscal 
adjustment ( shown in Fig. 4) explains the source of strongly positive effect of 
Balance on growth. The negative effect of Transfers on growth is reduced by specific 
reduction in this component of expenditure. Reduction in this component of 
expenditure is also the source of increase in Balance, underpinning the positive effect 
of Balance on Growth. 
 
In Model B, columns [1] and [2] in Table 2, Transfers as percentage of Total 
Expenditure is negative but the magnitude of the coefficient is substantially reduced 
as compared to model A. The coefficient is significant when used in the model with 
Corruption, Wage X Corruption and Period Dummy. Fig 4. illustrates that the Total 
Expenditure has been in the range of 38% to 31% of GDP during 1992-2001. The 
denominator of the expenditure components variables (ratios) in model B is Total 
Expenditure instead of GDP in model A. The magnitude and the change in ratios 
increase correspondingly. In model B it requires more change in the variable to have 
equal effect on the same dependent variable (i.e. growth rate) as in model A. 
Therefore, the estimated coefficient in model B is reduced.  
 
The significantly negative period dummy is partially offsetting the negative impact of 
Transfers in both Models A and B in columns [2] of Table 1 and 2. As shown in Fig 
4. Transfers increased in negative growth period (1992-94) before start decreasing in 
recovery period (1995-2001). 
 
Goods and Services 
The estimated coefficient of Goods & Services is also substantially decreased while 
moving from model A to model B as in the case of Transfers. It is –1.6 in model A 
and -0.19 in model B. 
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There is a change in sign of Goods & Services while moving from column [1] to [2], 
i.e. model B with Corruption, Wage X Corruption and Period Dummy. It is positive 
when the model is run only with Corruption, although both are insignificant and 
Corruption has negative coefficient (Table 3 in Appendix shows all versions of model 
B). The estimated coefficient of Corruption partially offset the negative impact of 
Goods & Services in transition economies. When Corruption is included with Period 
Dummy there is a sign change in the corruption coefficient though still insignificant. 
This indicate towards negative impact of corruption in the initial negative growth 
period which is  
offset by including period dummy.  
 
Wages and Salaries 
Wages & Salaries have positive coefficient in Model A, magnitude of the coefficient 
is small and insignificant. It is also incomparable with the estimated coefficient of 
Wages & Salaries in model B. The variance of this variable with respect to GDP 
growth rate is relatively small as compared to other variables given in Appendix 
Table 4 and 5. It can be explained as Adam et al (2003) argued that the low variability 
in fiscal aggregates relative to growth (both across countries and over time) hampers 
finding statistically strong effects from regression analysis.  
 
Capital Expenditure 
The significant negative coefficient of capital expenditure in Model B in columns [1] 
and [2] in Table 2 can be explained by looking at the description of the model. The 
expenditure compositions used in Model B are taken as percentage of Total 
Expenditure and not as percentage of GDP as in the case of Model A. In transition 
economies where total expenditure is constantly decreasing during the time period 
1992-2001, the increase in the ratio (Capital Expenditure /Total Expenditure) can not 
be attributed to the increase in the Capital expenditure as the decrease in the Total 
Expenditure can also increase this ratio. The ratio (Capital expenditure / Total 
expenditure) will increase even when the capital expenditure decreases relatively less 
than the total expenditure. Fig 4. illustrates that the decrease in the capital expenditure 
is less than the decrease in the total expenditure during the period 1992-2001, as the 
decrease in total expenditure is the composite decrease of the five components of total 
expenditure. Therefore, the negative coefficient of (Capital Expenditure / Total 
Expenditure ) in Model B is not comparable with the positive coefficient of (Capital 
Expenditure / GDP) in Model A.  
 
Interest Payments 
Interest Payments have negative coefficient in model A, although the magnitude is 
small and insignificant. The magnitude increases and the sign of the coefficient 
changes in model B when it is used as percentage of Total Expenditure. The change in 
sign can be explained as the interest payments are constant over time and total 
expenditure is decreasing in transition economies during 1992-2001 and the increase 
in magnitude can be attributed to relatively small variability in interest payment with 
respect to GDP growth rate variance which hampers statistical findings same as in the 
case of Wages & Salaries component of expenditure. 
 
Tax and Non-Tax Revenue 
All variation in Total Revenue is through variation in Tax Revenue. Non-Tax 
Revenue has very small variation as compared to GDP Growth rate as shown in Fig. 3 
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and Table 4 and 5 in Appendix. The coefficient on Tax Revenue is positive and 
insignificant. Tax Revenue is relatively stable (as proportion of GDP) as compared to 
Total Expenditure shown in Fig. 2. The theoretical explanation provided in Perroti 
(1999) explains such positive effect of taxation. The fiscal adjustment in transition 
economies is coming from shrinking expenditure. If the taxes are distortionary no 
change in the structure of taxes can have positive effects on growth. Fig 2. shows that 
the tax revenue is growing at a stable rate with the GDP Growth rate therefore 
minimizing distortions in the economy as explained in sub-section (a) in this section. 
 
Wage and Corruption interaction included in Model B is not improving the model 
except decreasing the significance of positive estimate of Wages & Salaries calculated 
as percentage of total expenditure. All conditional variables are insignificant in Fixed-
effect models, except terms of trade in Model A in column [1] of Table 1.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
If economic growth is a determinant of any of the fiscal variables, it can cause the 
problem of reverse causality which makes the explanatory variables endogenous. This 
is the same problem explained for Total Investment in sub-section (b). Estimation 
techniques that will not take into account endogeneity will estimate biased and 
inconsistent coefficients. Estimations methods to handle the issue of endogeneity are 
the instrumental variable ( IV ) approach suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) 
and the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator.  
 
One way to obtain asymptotically efficient estimators is to use the first difference 
GMM approach. In our model GMM is used by instrumenting the endogenous 
variables by one period lag and other exogenous variables. Results in last two 
columns of Table 1 and 2 broadly confirms the findings of previous model.  
 
The consistency of GMM estimates depends upon the assumption that there is no 
serial correlation in the error term. A failure of this assumption to hold leads to the 
instrument set becoming invalid. Hansen-Sargan test is a test of over-identifying 
restrictions under the joint null that instruments are valid and the model is correctly 
specified. It shows that all instruments are valid.  
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V.  Conclusion 
 
 
The debate on the effect of fiscal components on growth is not limited to the IMF 
functional classification of expenditure as described in Devarajan et al (1996). 
Economic classifications of expenditure also have different effects on growth 
depending on the sample of countries. But it is not possible to acquire data on sub-
divisions in transition economies to separate the effect as done in Devarajan et al 
(1996) for functional classifications in developing countries. 
 
The data in the economic classification cannot be exactly classified as productive or 
unproductive as done in Kneller et al. (1999), productive or residual expenditure as in 
Adam et al (2003). The characteristics of the economic classification in transition 
economies, when explained, make the classifications broadly comparable with 
productive and unproductive expenditure. For instance Transfers, which also include 
subsidies, can be partly productive if the subsidies are going to state-owned 
enterprises, which are common in transition economies. 
 
The economic reform variables do not explain my model, but they have significant 
effects in transition economies’ growth as explained in Havrylyshyn (1998) and 
transition economies’ democracy as explained in in Fidrmuc (2002). 
 
In the analysis presented on Low-Income countries in Gupta et al. (2002) Labour 
Force and Private Investment are the only two significant conditional variables and 
both are positive. While Labour Force is not significant in transition economies, 
estimations have indicated towards positive coefficient in the Fixed-effect estimate. 
 
In transition economies I found positive impact of budget balance on growth, which is 
in support with what Gupta et al (2002) find in low-income countries using same 
econometric specification and time period. The fiscal adjustment started in transition 
economies during early 1990s can be seen as bad times with excessive government. 
Perroti (1999) provides theoretical explanation for the non-Keynesian effect of fiscal 
policy during bad times.  
 
Capital spending has positive effect on growth in low-income countries sample in 
Gupta et al (2002), while it is negative in transition countries. The finding is in 
contrast with Gupta et al (2002) low income countries sample but supports Devarajan 
et al (1996) which argues that developing-country governments have been 
misallocating public expenditures in favour of capital expenditure at the expense of 
current expenditures, which is a different view to the policy feedback normally given 
to developing countries. Seemingly productive, capital expenditure, when used in 
excess could become unproductive. When the fiscal adjustment is already under 
progress and has limited choices, shrinking an expenditure component should be done 
keeping in view its impact on growth.  
 
With specific reference to transition economies, Schumpter’s concept of creative 
destruction describe such negative impact of capital on growth. The role of new 
investment decreases as the transition economies have to deal with inherited 
inefficiencies and under-utilized capacity. 
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The theoretical model of public policy endogenous growth model presented in Section 
II takes government provision of goods and services as an input in the private 
production function. Transforming from a complete communist state, as most of the 
economies were in my sample, there is no private production function, as there is no 
private capital input. Neither neo-classical public policy model can explain this non-
Keynesian response. Shumpter’s argument of painful creative destruction, within 
existing firms and reallocation of resources, and Perroti (1999) explanation of bad 
times fiscal policy explains effect of fiscal consolidation in transition economies. 
Once the transition economies have passed through an adjustment phase and 
recovered from negative growth, good times public-policy endogenous model can 
explain fiscal characteristics in transition economies outlined in Barro (1990). 
 
I found negative effect of Goods and Services in transition economies which is in 
contrast with Gupta et al (2002) findings in the case of low-income countries. 
Excessive spending on Goods and Services is expected in transition economies, which 
lead towards this negative estimated coefficient. Although, Wages and Salaries 
expenditure is not included in Goods and Services. Negative effect of Goods & 
Services and Transfers is partially offset when period dummy is included. The period 
dummy separates initial negative growth period of transition economies when these 
countries were passing through the painful adjustment phase.  
 
Regional features in transition economies (CIS, CEE, Baltics and Mongolia) were 
obvious in descriptive analysis. Taking account of regional differences in transition 
countries does not explain econometric estimations.  
 
The analysis in transition economies can not be extended to analyse the impact of 
source of financing, due to problems of data availability. The approach of Devarajan 
et al. (1996) to determine the effect of initial shares of expenditure on growth can be 
tested in the case of transition economies as they started with high shares of public 
expenditure in early 1990’s. A systematic approach to estimate the threshold values of 
nonlinear effect of Deficit, Debt and financing components, as followed in Adam et al 
(2003), can help understand the application of theories in transition economies. The 
improvement in quality of datasets from transition economies can answer these 
questions. In addition, extension of model to dynamic specification (such as Allerano-
Bond Estimator) can explain the unanswered questions, as the growth relationships 
are generally dynamic.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: MODEL A 
 FISCAL FACTORS AND GROWTH   
 
Fixed effects estimation  
Sample: Annual 1992-2001 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate in per capita GDP 
    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
    LSDV  LSDV  GMM  GMM 
 
Control variables 
Constant    19.05  17.85  22.1  19.46 
    [1.98]  [1.88]  [3.34]  [3.00] 
 
Initial GDP    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    [0.16]  [0.94]  [-0.68]  [-1.01] 
 
%∆ Investment   -0.043  -0.08  0.103  0.039 
    [-0.34]  [-0.62]  [1.38]  [0.46] 
 
Labour Force   0.163  0.142  0.167  0.129 
    [1.09]  [0.97]  [1.59]  [1.17] 
 
Terms of Trade   -0.069  -0.062  -0.054  -0.043 
    [-1.68]  [-1.53]  [-2.65]  [-2.13] 
 
Sec. School    -0.006  -0.157  -0.321  -0.476 
    [-0.01]  [-0.34]  [-1.01]  [-1.47] 
 
 
Fiscal factors 
 
Wages &    0.037  0.013  -0.293  -0.22 
Salaries / GDP   [0.06]  [0.02]  [-0.54]  [-0.41] 
 
Goods &    -1.664  -1.507  -1.552  -1.356 
Services /GDP   [-5.71]  [-5.01]  [-5.56]  [-4.64] 
 
Interest / GDP   -0.039  -0.095  0.158  0.033 
    [-0.12]  [-0.29]  [0.87]  [0.17] 
 
Transfers / GDP   -1.158  -1.057  -1.065  -0.949 
    [-3.59]  [-3.27]  [-3.84]  [-3.57] 
 
Capital / GDP   0.721  0.768  0.414  0.512 
    [1.81]  [1.95]  [2.14]  [2.53] 
 
Tax Revenue /GDP   0.137  0.255  0.318  0.449 
    [0.56]  [1.01]  [2.01]  [2.78] 
 
Non-Tax Revenue    1.255  1.29  1.753  1.718 
/GDP    [2.44]  [2.56]  [5.56]  [5.51] 
 
Grants / GDP   -2.7  -2  -0.013  0.417 
    [-1.94]  [1.4]  [-0.01]  [0.51] 
 
Period Dummy     -2.27    -3.23 
      [-1.71]    [-2.95] 
 
 
 
No. of Obs.    84  84  84  84 
 
Hansen Test    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
p-value 
 
R-Squared    0.74  0.76   
R-Squared Cen       0.69  0.72 
 
Adj R-Squared   0.62  0.64 
R-Squared Uncen       0.75  0.77 
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TABLE 2:  MODEL B 
FISCAL FACTORS AND GROWTH  
 
Fixed effects estimation  
Sample: Annual 1992-2001 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate in per capita GDP 
    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
    LSDV  LSDV  GMM  GMM 
 
Control variables 
Constant    -6.55  2.887  -6.549    
    [-0.52]  [0.16]  [-0.86] 
 
Initial GDP    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    [-0.63]  [2.25]  [-0.69]  [1.22] 
 
%∆ Investment   0.098  0.183  0.098  0.183 
    [0.49]  [0.95]  [0.51]  [1.22] 
 
Labour Force   0.151  0.118  0.151  0.118 
    [0.85]  [0.72]  [0.94]  [0.68] 
 
Terms of Trade   0.000  -0.057  -0.001  -0.057 
    [-0.02]  [-1.19]  [-0.03]  [-2.10] 
 
Sec. School    0.379  -0.429  0.379  -0.429 
    [0.65]  [0.78]  [0.92]  [-0.95] 
 
 
Fiscal factors 
 
Wages &    1.15  0.36  1.15  0.36 
Salaries / TE   [5.32]  [0.60]  [5.62]  [0.88] 
 
Goods &    -0.187  0.014  -0.187  0.014 
Services / TE   [-2.17]  [0.16]  [-2.13]  [0.19] 
 
Interest / TE    0.267  0.131  0.267  0.131 
    [1.49]  [0.84]  [1.87]  [1.14] 
 
Transfers / TE   -0.175  -0.443  -0.175  -0.443 
    [-1.36]  [-3.34]  [-1.47]  [-3.99] 
 
Capital / TE    -0.231  -0.418  -0.231  -0.418 
    [-1.56]  [-3.14]  [-2.56]  [-5.82] 
 
Balance / GDP   0.582  0.606  0.582  0.606 
    [2.42]  [3.04]  [2.84]  [3.54] 
 
Wage* Corruption     0.800    0.800  
      [0.46]    [0.74] 
 
Corruption      1.763    1.763 
      [0.54]    [0.91] 
 
Period Dummy     -3.88    -3.88 
      [-2.71]    [-2.70] 
 
 
No. of Obs.    77  72  77  72 
 
 
Hansen Test    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
p-value 
 
R-Squared    0.69  0.77 
R-Squared Cen       0.69  0.77 
 
Adj R-Squared   0.56  0.66 
R-Squared Uncen       0.73  0.82 
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TABLE 3: MODEL B (DIFFERENT VERSIONS) 
FISCAL FACTORS AND GROWTH :   
 
Fixed effects estimation  
Sample: Annual 1992-2001 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate in per capita GDP 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
   LSDV  LSDV  LSDV  LSDV  LSDV 
 
Control variables 
Constant   -6.55  6.77  -7.52  -3.39  2.887 
   [-0.52]  [0.56]  [-0.60]  [-0.30]  [0.16] 
 
Initial GDP0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   [-0.63]  [-0.46]  [1.3]  [1.67]  [2.5]
    
%∆ Investment  0.098  0.09  0.235  0.159  0.183
  
   [0.49]  [0.49]  [1.26]  [0.92]  [0.95]
  
 
Labour Force  0.151  0.107  0.12  0.04  0.118
  
   [0.85]  [0.66]  [0.73]  [0.26]  [0.72]
  
 
Terms of Trade  0.000  -0.026  -0.036  -0.043  -0.057
  
   [-0.02]  [-0.52]  [-0.74]  [-0.95]  [-1.19]
  
 
Sec. School   0.379  -0.106  0.01  -0.222  -0.429 
   [0.65]  [-0.19]  [0.02]  [-0.45]  [-0.78] 
 
 
Fiscal factors 
 
Wages &   1.15  1.13  0.908  0.918  0.36
  
Salaries / TE  [5.32]  [5.74]  [4.51]  [4.98]  [0.60] 
 
Goods &   0.187  -0.182  0.071  0.029  0.014 
Services / TE  [-2.17]  [-2.31]  [0.74]  [0.33]  [0.16] 
 
Interest / TE   0.267  0.14  0.233  0.116  0.131
  
   [1.49]  [0.83]  [1.38]  [0.73]  [0.84] 
 
Transfers / TE  -0.175  -0.251  -0.274  -0.313  -0.443
  
   [-1.36]  [-2.1]  [-2.28]  [-2.83]  [-3.34]
  
 
Capital / TE   -0.231  -0.293  -0.308  -0.359  -0.418
  
   [-1.56]  [-2.15]  [-2.34]  [-2.95]  [3.14] 
 
Balance / GDP  0.582  0.593  0.491  0.534  0.606
  
   [2.42]  [2.7]  [2.26]  [2.68]  [3.04] 
 
Wage* Corruption          0.8 
           [0.46] 
 
Corruption       -0.621  0.798  1.763 
       [-0.34]  [0.46]  [0.54] 
 
Period Dummy    -5.038    -4.529  -3.88 
     [-3.41]    [-3.27]  [-2.71] 
 
 
No. of Obs.   77  77  73  73  72 
 
 
Hansen Test   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
p-value 
 
R-Squared   0.69  0.75  0.74  0.79  0.77 
        
 
Adj R-Squared  0.56  0.64  0.63  0.69  0.66 
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TABLE 4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF COMPLETE SAMPLE 
 
Variables Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Observations 
       
Total Exp /GDP 36.99 38.8 10.07 3.99 0.032 188 
 
GDP Growth -0.737 2.23 10.004 7.897 -1.777 260 
 
Initial GDP 780072.7 18390.18 3052124 23.03 4.646 260 
 
%∆Investment 23.099 23.38 8.277 5.093 0.399 230 
 
Labour Force -0.499 -0.193 5.179 12.289 0.882 224 
 
Terms of Trade 102.13 100 42.52 84.256 7.827 260 
 
Sec. School 1339568 633356 2454619 21.325 4.172 237 
 
Wages & Salary/GDP 6.604 6.73 2.813 2.15 -0.102 151 
 
Goods & Services/GDP 8.13 8.1 4.148 4.859 0.778 138 
 
Interest/GDP 2.67 1.55 4.95 93.12 8.393 198 
 
Transfers/GDP 13.115 13.19 6.68 2.86 0.307 163 
 
Capital/GDP 4.39 3.8 3.32 6.84 1.77 140 
 
Tax Revenue 26.94 28.2 10.19 1.83 -0.097 177 
 
NonTax Revenue 3.319 2.5 2.24 2.66 0.908 185 
 
Grants 0.27 0 0.52 8.97 2.43 177 
 
Corruption 3.24 3 1.01 2.037 0.075 175 
 
Balance -3.56 -2.6 4.53 12.35 -2.48 170 
 
Domestic Finance 2.56 1.15 5.33 12.82 2.61 126 
 
Foreign Finance 2.57 1.5 4.76 10.75 -0.22 123 
 
Wages& Salaries/Exp 17.57 19.11 7.04 2.6 -0.56 142 
 
Goods& Service/Exp 21.84 20.77 11.93 3.17 0.24 131 
 
Interest/Exp 6.48 4.2 7.07 11.37 2.52 179 
 
Transfer/Exp 33.83 33.17 14.72 3.09 0.08 152 
 
Capital/Exp 12.36 10.1 9.08 4.9 1.51 134 
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TABLE 5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SUB-SAMPLE 
 
Variables Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Observations 
       
Total Exp /GDP 37.57 39.65 7.6 2.57 -0.65 84 
 
GDP Growth 2.55 4.02 5.61 3.38 -0.83 84 
 
Initial GDP 1291839 43522.74 4077633 11.89 3.29 84 
 
%∆Investment 24.56 25.2 6.73 3.93 -0.41 84 
 
Labour Force -0.68 -0.026 2.93 9.1 -1.62 84 
 
Terms of Trade 97.5 100 16.75 7.5 0.214 84 
 
Sec. School 9.86 10.14 1.96 3.90 -0.79 84 
 
Wages & Salary/GDP 6.47 6.5 2.59 1.84 0.006 84 
 
Goods & Services/GDP 8.44 8.55 4.23 3.94 0.24 84 
 
Interest/GDP 2.34 1.4 3.14 16.23 3.42 84 
 
Transfers/GDP 13.44 12.94 5.84 2.89 0.39 84 
 
Capital/GDP 4.87 3.95 3.8 5.52 1.64 84 
 
Tax Revenue 30.4 29.6 8.68 2.07 -0.152 84 
 
NonTax Revenue 3.24 2.49 2.089 2.99 1.08 84 
 
Grants 0.306 0 0.569 8.18 2.29 84 
 
Corruption 3.63 4 1.04 1.95 -0.375 80 
 
Balance -2.25 -1.8 3.02 7.3 -1.6 73 
 
Domestic Finance 1.57 0.7 3.38 6.91 1.88 39 
 
Foreign Finance 2.16 1.05 3.68 3.99 1.3 36 
 
Wages& Salaries/Exp 17.1 17.67 5.9 2.12 -0.19 79 
 
Goods& Service/Exp 22.52 22.35 10.69 2.86 -0.37 79 
 
Interest/Exp 6.44 3.22 8.04 11.71 2.71 79 
 
Transfer/Exp 33.79 31.79 12.79 2.95 0.34 79 
 
Capital/Exp 12.99 10.25 9.45 3.92 1.32 84 
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TABLE 6 
REGIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES 
 
Baltics   CEE   CIS 
 
Latvia   Bulgaria  Tajkistan 
Lithuania  Macedonia  Belarus 
Estonia  Slovenia  Moldova 
   Croatia  Russia 
   Cezh Republic  Georgia 
   Poland   Azerbaijan 
   Romania  Kyrgyz Republic  
   Hungry  Armenia 
   Albania  Ukraine 
   Slovak Republic Uzbekistan 
      Turkmenistan 
      Kazakhstan 
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